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Differences in use and function of verbal irony between real and 




This paper presents a contrastive approach to the presence of two distinct types of verbal irony in 
real (natural, unscripted) versus fictional (scripted) discourse, with a special focus on irony 
blindness, i.e. the inability to recognize ironic utterances. Irony strategies are categorized into 
two general types, based on the relationship between the expressed and the intended meaning 
(Type 1: meaning reversal and Type 2: meaning replacement). First, the differences between 
these two types are discussed in terms of use, interpretation, and misinterpretation. It is found 
that the first type of irony strongly prevails in natural discourse, while the second type is 
considerably more present in fictional discourse than it is in natural discourse. At the same time, 
the first type of irony appears to be more at risk of misinterpretation in natural discourse, as 
opposed to the second type, which seems to be a safer (even though less frequently selected) 
option. These findings are then further analyzed in light of the discussion concerning fictional 
(comedic, in particular) irony blindness and the construction and role of the irony blind 
characters. Interestingly, the causes of fictional irony blindness are found to correlate more 
strongly with the (more humorous) misinterpretation of the second type of irony. 
 





Verbal irony (henceforth irony
1
), is usually treated as a unified phenomenon and any differences 
among the particular strategies that speakers employ in order to achieve it are not investigated 
(Attardo 2000, Wilson and Sperber 1992; Clark and Gerrig 1984, inter alia). However, in the 
light of recent studies (Kapogianni 2011a, 2013; Partington 2011; Dynel 2013a, 2013b), the 
necessity arises to examine and categorise irony strategies, a line of research which is bound to 
reveal crucial differences at a pragmatic (discourse), cognitive, and cultural levels.  
In terms of methodology, being able to capture the full range of irony strategies requires a 
definition of the phenomenon that does not restrict its breadth by equating it with one single 
linguistic/rhetorical device. For example, the widely discussed definition of irony as “echoic 
mention” (Wilson and Sperber 1992, Wilson 2006) may work very well when describing one 
specific rhetorical device that achieves irony (example (1) below) but it fails to capture other 
devices (strategies) that are equally effective at conveying the ironic intention of the speaker 
(examples (2)-(4)). Similarly, considering irony as the opposite of what is said (Grice 1978) or 
even an act of indirect negation (Giora 1995) restricts the phenomenon to cases where there is a 
clear relationship of semantic opposition between the expressed and the implicated meaning. 
Examples (1)-(4) illustrate the complexity of the phenomenon and can be used to support the 
argument that single-strategy definitions (i.e. definitions that treat one single rhetorical device as 
the essence of the phenomenon) can be a cause of limitations to its full and adequate 
examination.  
 
(1)  Yesterday, Mary said to John “It’s going to be a nice day for a picnic tomorrow, let’s 
have a picnic!”. They prepared food and packed their picnic basket, but today it’s been 
raining heavily since early in the morning. John turns to Mary and says: 
Nice day for a picnic! 
(2)    No, I’m not annoyed at you for stealing my lunch and letting me starve for the rest of the 
day. 
(3)  This party is amazing! 
(4)  Mary: Tom says he is the best student in the class. 
John: And I am the White Witch of Narnia! 
 
Example (1) is a clear case of echoic mention, since John echoes Mary’s previous utterance. The 
speakers in (2), (3), and (4), however, do not (or, at least, not necessarily) mention or allude to 
any previous statements or ideas. Example (2) is a strategy that includes explicit negation, where 
the ironic meaning is reached by removing (negating) this negation: “I am (very) annoyed at you 
for stealing my lunch”. Example (3) is also a case of (indirect) negation or, to use a more general 
term, meaning reversal. Here, depending on the context, the example may or may not be the 
result of echoic mention: the speaker may allude to a previous utterance or idea, but this is not 
necessary for the interpretation of the irony, which primarily relies on the contrast between what 
is said and the situational context of the utterance. Finally, example (4) is neither a case of 
meaning reversal nor a case of echoic mention: the intended meaning is not “I am not the White 
Witch of Narnia”, but rather “Tom’s claim is impossible”, and neither is this echoing another 
utterance
2
. Therefore, the examination of these examples leads to two important observations: (a) 
there are multiple irony strategies, which can be completely diverse or even overlap (e.g. an 
echoic reading of (3)), and (b) any definitional attempt should not be strategy-specific, but 
schematic enough to encompass all possible strategies. 
With the above observations in mind, and in place of a definition, it is worth adopting a set of 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the presence of irony:   
i. Background contrast: An ironic utterance is preceded by some (underlying) contrast in 
the context/situation. This can be a clash of ideas, beliefs, or ideals (speaker’s beliefs 
versus hearer’s beliefs, ideal conditions versus reality, etc.). 
ii.  Incompatibility between what is said and some element of the context at hand: This 
condition broadens the usual observation that ironic statements are counterfactual. An 
ironically intended utterance can express something which is not necessarily 
counterfactual but is strongly incompatible with the conversational expectations (see 
discussion on example (8)). Of course, in cases such as (4), the obvious counterfactuality 
is only part of the incongruous character of the utterance, the most important part being 
its inappropriateness for the given context. 
iii. Speaker’s evaluative attitude (cf. Grice 1978): In all cases of irony, the speaker’s main 
intention is to express some sort of evaluation. This is usually, but not necessarily, 
negative: in examples (1)-(3) the speaker criticises something about the current situation 
(weather, act of stealing, party), while in example (4) the speaker criticises the target’s 
(Tom’s) belief.  
 
The definition of the term irony strategy, as it emerges from this discussion, can be given as 
follows: it is a rhetorical device that employs a range of linguistic (pragmatic) features in order to 
express the speaker’s ironic intention. The various irony strategies are not just different means to 
the same end. It is reasonable to suppose that strategy selection is influenced by different factors 
and serves different purposes. The present discussion employs a typological classification of 
irony strategies, based on linguistic pragmatic criteria, and highlights a variety of factors that 
influence their choice and interpretation. Section 2 presents the typology of irony strategies and 
explains the central hypothesis of this paper, namely a correlation between the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of each irony type (mainly meaning derivation and humor) and its use and 
(mis)interpretation in different discourse contexts. The hypothesized correlation is first 
investigated in terms of irony type frequency in real (unscripted) versus fictional (scripted) 
discourse (section 3). Then, the discussion focuses on cases of misinterpretation and the issue of 
irony blindness and, in particular, its representation through comedic characters. More 
specifically, section 4 aims to explain: (a) how the idiosyncratic characteristics of the two irony 
types affect their risk of misinterpretation in real versus fictional discourse, and (b) how irony 
types are exploited in the comedic portrayal of irony blindness. 
 
 
2. Typological approach of irony strategies 
 
The theoretical framework for the present discussion is that of (Neo-) Gricean pragmatics, with 
the distinction between expressed and intended meaning playing a central role. The typological 
approach suggested in this section is based on two pragmatic criteria, in the form of the 
following questions: (a) Is there some semantic relationship between the expressed and the 
intended meaning? (b) What sort of reasoning underlies the derivation of the intended meaning? 
The second part of this section (2.2) is concerned with the factors that influence the interpretation 
of irony types, leading to predictions about its contexts of use. 
 
2.1. Irony types 
 
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the variety of irony strategies leads to their classification 
into two main types
3
: the first one, also being the most typical and commonly discussed, can be 
termed as meaning reversal (Type 1), and the second one, in which there is no semantic 
relationship between the expressed and the intended meaning, can be termed as meaning 
replacement (Type 2). The latter is also characterised by its close proximity to surrealist humor, 
which is why it can also be described as “surrealistic irony” (Kapogianni 2011a). The following 
examples (5-9) present a variety of strategies that can be classified under each general type (the 
first line provides the expressed meaning and the second line the intended meaning, i.e. the ironic 
implicature): 
 
(5)  I love having to mark all these essays! 
   +> I hate having to mark all these essays. 
(6)  a.  There is a bit of a drizzle. 
+> The rain is really heavy. 
  b. At 30 km/h, I’m approaching the speed of light! 
 +> 30km/h is a really slow speed. 
(7) A: Was I speeding? 
B: No, you were standing still. It’s the scenery that’s been whizzing by at 90 mph. 
+> You already know the answer / Your question is unnecessary. 
(8) A: I am going to the airport.  
B: Why, what’s in the airport? 
A: Airplanes! 
+> Your question is annoying (I refuse to give you an informative answer). 
(9) Mary: Tom says he is the best student in the class. 
John: And I am the White Witch of Narnia! 
+> Tom’s statement is invalid. 
 
Examples (5-6) can be classified under the meaning reversal type of irony (Type 1) and this is 
because a semantic relationship between (some element of) the expressed and the intended 
meaning can be detected. Example (5) is a typical case of opposition, where the ironically 
intended meaning is an antonym of the expressed meaning. Examples (6a) and (6b) also illustrate 
the process of meaning reversal, although not through a direct and absolute opposition as in (5), 
but rather through reversal on a scale: the hearer needs to consider an ad hoc scale from “bit of 
drizzle” to “heavy rain” and one from “really slow speed” to “speed of light” in order to get to 
the intended meaning of the speaker. Therefore, the general strategy of reversal can be further 
distinguished into absolute and scalar. 
Moving on to the second general type of irony (Type 2 – meaning replacement), the main 
characteristic of which is the lack of semantic relationship between what is expressed and what is 
intended, it can be observed that the intended proposition (always some sort of negative 
evaluation towards a previous utterance – henceforth target utterance) completely replaces the 
expressed proposition. In example (7), where a car driver has just been stopped by a police 
officer (speaker A is the driver, and speaker B the police officer), speaker B responds to speaker 
A in a way that is not irrelevant to the question but is obviously counterfactual, his main 
intention being to express a negative attitude towards the driver’s redundant question. Example 
(8) is very interesting because it illustrates the strong element of incompatibility on which this 
type of irony relies, even when there is no obvious counterfactuality. In this example, speaker A 
intends to criticize speaker B’s nosy question by responding in a completely uninformative 
manner, which contradicts the expectations related to the adjacency pair “question-(informative) 
answer”. As in the other examples of this type, the intended meaning is not any sort of reversal 
of the expressed meaning, but, instead a negative evaluation of the target utterance (question). 
Finally, in (9), repeating an example that was presented earlier (in (4)), a different subtype of this 
general irony type (meaning replacement) is illustrated: the irrelevant and counterfactual 
statement. This statement is not in any way related to the context, but it is used as a juxtaposition 
(usually of a similar structure) to the target utterance (in this example, Tom’s reported statement 
that he is the best in class). By a juxtaposing the two statements, it emerges that the original must 
be as flawed as the one that carries the ironic intent. 
To sum up, the meaning replacement type of irony makes use of an incompatible, often 
counterfactual and even surrealistic meaning in order to convey criticism against the target 
statement or idea. The ironic utterance can be either relevant to the context while also being 
incompatible (incongruous) and inappropriate (7 and 8), or it can be contextually irrelevant and  
in an obvious juxtaposition to the target (evaluated) utterance. Figure 1 summarizes the main 





2.2. Comparison of the two general irony types 
 
The two general irony types (meaning reversal and meaning replacement) exhibit some 
considerable differences, primarily in terms of meaning derivation and, additionally, in terms of 
humor.  
The first main observation is that the nature of incongruity between the utterance and its 
context is different for the two irony types. For the meaning reversal type, the hearers need to 
recognize the fact that the utterance is untrue for the given context in order to be led to some sort 
of semantically opposed meaning, either by direct opposition or by ad hoc scalar reversal. For 
the meaning replacement type, on the other hand, the hearers have to consider the strong 
incompatibility between the utterance and context, as well as its juxtaposition to the target 
utterance, while resorting to a syllogism such as “If the [target] utterance is 
valid/sensible/appropriate, then the speaker’s utterance is also valid/sensible/appropriate. The 
speaker’s utterance is blatantly invalid/absurd/inappropriate and, therefore, so is the target 
utterance”. In other words, in order to understand the intended meaning in this type of irony, 
interlocutors make use of an implicit “if-then” conditional. The antecedent includes a 
hypothetical positive evaluation of the target utterance (e.g. “if statement x is reasonable”, “if 
idea y makes sense” etc), while the consequent (apodosis) would include the same positive 
evaluation about the ironist’s utterance (“what the speaker said is reasonable/makes sense”). The 
consequent is immediately taken as false by virtue of the inappropriateness or counterfactuality 
of the ironist’s utterance, which leads to the conclusion that the antecedent must also be false 
and, therefore, any evaluation of the target utterance must be negative.  
The above is also related to the observation that the contrast between a context and its 
“mirror” (i.e. the actual context of a Type 1 ironic utterance and the context for which the literal 
meaning of the utterance would be appropriate) is less strong, or, sometimes, less obvious than 
the contrast between two incongruous or completely unrelated contexts (i.e. the actual context of 
a Type 2 ironic utterance and the context for which the literal meaning of the utterance would be 
appropriate). 
Another feature that distinguishes the two types is their relationship with humor. The type of 
meaning replacement (which can often be characterized as “surrealist irony”, especially in the 
cases where the utterance is completely unrelated to the given context) is almost always 






Figure 1 Main types and subtypes of irony (based on pragmatic criteria) 
Context-relevant Context-irrelevant 
concerned, depending on the context. These observations tie in with the very nature of the 
meaning replacement type, which relies on the same incongruity resolution process as all of 
verbal humor. 
Given the above discussion, three central predictions can be made in relation to the use and 
function of the different types of irony across different discourse contexts: (a) the less striking 
contrast between appropriate and actual context will make the meaning reversal type more prone 
to misinterpretation, (b) the humorous nature of the meaning replacement type will enhance its 
use in humorous contexts, and (c) – given (a) and (b) – misinterpretation of the meaning 
replacement type, being more unexpected and simultaneously more humorous, will be prevalent 
in fictional contexts, especially when the humor revolves around a character’s inability to see the 
irony. These hypotheses will be tested and discussed in the remainder of the paper. 
 
 
3. Frequency observations 
 
In order to have a basis of comparison between the two kinds of discourse that are contrasted in 
this paper, this section presents some evidence concerning the presence of the two general types 
of irony in real (natural) and fictional (scripted) discourse. The discussed data come from a 
variety of natural and scripted sources. The examples were collected from Modern Greek as well 
as English sources. The former were considered particularly interesting since the phenomenon of 
irony has not been studied extensively in Modern Greek (exceptions: Faraklou 1998, 2000; 
Tsakona 2011). The choice to present frequency data in separate tables for Greek and English, 
was made solely on the principle that each collection of examples relied on a different variety of 
sources. Any cross-linguistic and cross-cultural considerations were thus not part of the scope of 
this paper. It is, however, recognized that some interesting comparisons can be drawn on the 
basis of the overall greater frequency of the second irony type strategies in the Greek data, which 
is something to be addressed by further research. 
Data collection employed a variety of methods, depending on the particularities of the source 
and on the use of the definitional approach that focuses on a set of necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions (section 1). Table 1 presents information about the sources of Greek and 
English data (the abbreviations next to each source were used for coding purposes). 
 
Natural discourse 
Source Greek English 
Talk shows (TSh)   
Instant messaging (IM)   
Forums (F)   
“Karatheodoris” data-base recordings4  (KR)   
Twitter (T)   
Scripted discourse 
TV series / Movies (TS/M)   
Comic books (CB)   
Table 1 Sources of collected data (natural vs. scripted discourse) 
 
Table 2 shows the number of ironic instances collected from each Greek source. Some of the 
collected ironic utterances contained more than one ironic sentences, which were coded and 
counted as separate instances (units). 
 
Natural discourse Scripted discourse 
Source Instances   Source Instances 
TSh 32 TS/M 45 
IM 8 CB 6 
F 10   
KR 11   
TOTAL 61  51 
Table 2 Quantity of collected examples - Greek  
 
As shown in Table 2, a total of 61 instances was collected from the four sources of natural 
discourse, and 51 instances were collected from the two sources of fictional discourse. Table 3 
presents the observed frequency of the meaning reversal (Type 1) versus meaning replacement 
(Type 2) irony types in each of the two types of discourse. 
 
 Natural Scripted 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Type1 50 82% 15 29.4% 
Type2 11 18% 36 70.6% 
Total 61  51  
Table 3 Irony types in natural versus scripted data - Greek 
 
These results show a great prevalence of the meaning reversal type in natural data. They also 
show the reverse picture in the case of scripted data, which creates a rather striking contrast 
between the two types of discourse. The contrast was milder in the case of English data, but the 
distribution of the meaning replacement type was still very uneven between natural and scripted 
discourse, even if the meaning reversal type prevailed in both (data presented in Table 5 below). 
Table 4 shows the overall amount of collected irony instances from each English source. 
 
Natural discourse Scripted discourse 
Source Instances   Source Instances 
F 33 TS/M 70 
T 32   
TOTAL 65  70 
Table 4 Quantity of collected examples – English 
 
Table 5 shows the presence of each irony type in real versus scripted discourse contexts. As 
noted earlier, the difference is less striking than in the Greek data, with the meaning replacement 
(Type 2) type remaining less frequent than the meaning reversal (Type 1) type across discourse 
contexts. However, the most important observation, here, is the considerably higher percentage 
of the meaning replacement in scripted as opposed to real discourse. 
 
 
 Real Scripted 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Type1 58 89.2% 48 68.6% 
Type2 7 10.8% 22 31.4% 
Total 65  70  
Table 5 Irony types in natural versus scripted data – English 
 
Overall, the first irony type (meaning reversal), which is generally considered as the most typical 
one, is also used more frequently overall, or, at least, in the less demanding/less innovative 
contexts which are mostly associated with natural discourse. The prevalence of the second type 
(meaning replacement) within scripted data for the Greek collection is a very interesting 
observation, which leads to the conclusion that the humorous character of this type makes it 
more preferable in fictional (comedic) contexts. The English evidence does not contradict this 
observation, in the sense that there is still a considerable percentage of the second type of irony 
found in fictional discourse, even if this is not enough to surpass the prevalent presence of the 
first type of irony. As stated earlier, further crosslinguistic and crosscultural research is needed in 
order to account for this asymmetry between the two languages, for which, as far as this paper 
and this particular collection of data are concerned, no further claims can be made at this point, 
due to the important variation among the types of sources that were used for each language.  
 
4. Irony misinterpretation – irony blindness 
 
Irony blindness can be defined in opposition to circumstantial misinterpretation: while the 
former is a characteristic of the recipient (addressee, (over)hearer, viewer), the latter is 
influenced by factors such as the contextual circumstances and their ability to reinforce or 
obscure the ironic meaning, as well as the irony strategy itself, which may be more or less prone 
to misinterpretation. This section looks at both circumstantial misinterpretation and fictional 
irony blindness and their different manifestations. Furthermore, the present discussion aims at 
drawing parallels between the factors that affect successful irony interpretation at a 
circumstantial level and the causes of fictional irony blindness. 
 
4.1. Circumstantial misinterpretation 
 
The distinctions drawn between the different types of irony (section 2) can play an important role 
in the analysis of the causes of circumstantial misinterpretation of ironic utterances. This is the 
aim of section 4.1.2, which focuses on a collection of misinterpreted ironies. Before the causes of 
circumstantial misinterpretation are discussed, it is worth highlighting the distinction between 
ignoring (missing) and misunderstanding an ironically intended utterance. 
 
4.1.1. Missing versus misunderstanding. Ideally, a comprehensive examination of irony 
misinterpretation would include both cases of overtly misunderstanding the irony and covertly 
missing the irony, i.e. the recipient remaining unresponsive, being unaware of the presence of 
irony. However, the case of covertly missing the irony is not easy (if not impossible) to detect. 
This is because a lack of response may equally mean either silent/implicit appreciation or failure 
of recognition (Kotthoff 2003). A caveat when studying misinterpretation is, therefore, the fact 
that it is only explicit misunderstandings that are recorded in conversation, while numerous cases 
of failure of recognition of the phenomenon remain under the radar. 
In the case of overt misinterpretation, the (recorded) response considers the literal meaning of 
the ironically intended utterance to be part of the common ground and continues the discussion 
in a way that reveals the misunderstanding. The ironist may then choose a way of repairing the 
misinterpretation, usually by (a) explicitly declaring the previous utterance ironic (“I meant it 
ironically”, “I was being sarcastic), (b) spelling out the intended meaning of the previous 
utterance (“I didn’t mean x, I meant y”), or (c) retaining the ironic framework, but with an irony 
strategy that is more obvious than the previous one. 
As far as the case of covertly missing the irony is concerned, a further comparison between 
real and fictional discourse can be made: in real discourse, the hearer is either completely 
unaware of the irony or chooses not to respond, due to not being certain about the ironic 
interpretation and for fear of loosing face; in fictional discourse, on the other hand, the ironic 
utterance is often the punch line that marks the end of a scene, and the reason there are no 
recorded responses is that they are not part of the script. It is only when the misinterpretation 
becomes the focus of the humorous script that it becomes explicit and, therefore, available for 
analysis. 
 
4.1.2. Type-related causes of misinterpretation. Instances of irony misinterpretation in the 
medium of asynchronous Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) were collected and 
analysed. Asynchronous CMC is text-based communication, conducted through networked 
computers (e-mail, message boards, comment sections etc., see Herring 2003). This medium was 
preferred because, aside from the advantage of the body of on-line texts functioning as a 
searchable corpus, it is fertile ground for misinterpretations, since the lack of extralinguistic cues 
makes the interpretation of irony dependent on linguistic and contextual information only. As 
research by Hancock (2004) revealed, contrary to what would be expected from the lack of 
extralinguistic cues and the consequent risk of miscommunication, irony is not avoided in CMC, 
but it rather tends to be used to a greater extent than in face-to-face communication.  
Instances of irony misinterpretation were detected through a search for “repair phrases” such 
as “I was being ironic”, “I meant it ironically”, “I was not serious/(only) kidding”, “You didn’t 
get the irony” and their variations in tense.5 These statements were used as search terms on 
internet search engines. A total of 50 dialogues containing misinterpreted ironies were collected, 
both in Greek and English, in parallel to the non-contrastive two-language nature of the corpus of 
ironic examples described in section 3, which did not provide enough instances of 
misinterpretation, making the separate collection of misinterpreted examples necessary. Here, I 
will not report on any quantitative indications, but I will focus on the qualitative findings of the 
analysis of this collection of examples. 
The body of misinterpreted utterances can clearly be divided into three categories of ironic 
sub-strategies: (a) meaning reversal (Type 1) ironies that include a relative/subjective 
(evaluative) term, (b) meaning reversal ironies that include an echoed opinion, that is, in fact, the 
opinion that the ironist intends to criticise, (c) a very limited number of instances of meaning 
replacement (Type 2) irony of the context-relevant subtype. 
In the first category of misinterpreted examples, the central element is some case of subjective 
judgment expressed via the use of adjectives, adverbs and various evaluative expressions (e.g 
cheap/expensive, fast/slow, fortunately/unfortunately, etc.). The misinterpretation of these is 
justified by the lack of sufficient contextual and common ground information available to the 
addressee/reader. Given the usual anonymity and/or lack of personal relationship between 
interlocutors in CMC, it is understandable why addressees have considered the ironic utterance 
as the ironist’s plausible literal contribution. The presence of misinterpreted ironies that use the 
echoic mention strategy is also easily justifiable, considering that an echoed phrase is usually 
likely to be uttered (by someone with the same ideas as the ironist’s target) in the same context. 
Gibbs (2012: 16) also points out the necessity of recognizing the source of the echo as a common 
precondition for the correct interpretation of echoic ironies, which is something that is not 
always possible. Finally, it is worth noting that the small number of instances of misinterpreted 
meaning replacement (Type 2) ironies, are contextually relevant (as opposed to context-
irrelevant utterances) and the addressee justifies them as a mistake/miscalculation or ignorance 
on the part of the speaker.  
This categorisation of misinterpreted ironies concurs with what can be seen as part of the 
wider categorisation of implicit meaning misinterpretation proposed by Yus (1999). He 
recognises three major factors of miscommunication at the level of the implicit: the lack of 
necessary contextual assumptions (which cause a “puzzled understanding”), the erroneous use of 
alternative contextual assumptions, and the hearer considering it unnecessary to search for a 
meaning other than the explicit (both of which lead to “an alternate understanding”). Yus (1999: 
512) considers the misinterpretation of irony as a consequence of the third factor. However, it is 
clear from this analysis that accepting the explicit meaning as the intended one is a direct 
consequence of the (combination of) the other two factors: a lack of necessary background 
assumptions, established common ground, and indications of the speaker’s intentions.  
The second irony type (meaning replacement) stands out in this analysis, not only because of 
the lack of evidence of misinterpretation for two of its substrategies, but also because of the fact 
that the necessary factors for their understanding do not coincide with the aforementioned factors 
that mostly affect the first type of irony: when it comes to necessary background assumptions, 
these come from non-situational general world knowledge (and are therefore less likely to be 
missing), as for the search for cues regarding the ironist’s insincerity/lack of seriousness,  these 
are usually obvious due to the strong incongruity and/or counterfactuality of the statements of 
this irony type. 
On the whole, despite some common generalisations, there seem to be different causes of 
misunderstanding for the two general types of irony, which employ different strategies (e.g. the 
highly context dependent strategy of echoic mention employed by the first) and rely on different 
types of assumptions (e.g. assumptions about the beliefs of the speaker in the case of meaning 




4.2. Irony blindness in fictional discourse 
In reality, the inability of detecting irony is usually considered a symptom of pragmatic language 
impairment (PLI), which, in turn, is linked to poor Theory of Mind (Happé 1993). Although the 
status of PLI as either an independent impairment or a correlate of other disorders is frequently 
debated, a strong link between PLI and Autism Spectrum Disorders can be identified (Bishop 
2000). This means that the real-life profile of an irony blind individual would be of clinical 
nature. Although characters with PLI and related disorders (especially Autism Spectrum 
Disorders and Asperger Syndrome in particular) are frequently portrayed in fiction, it is 
interesting to note that there is a large category of non-clinical (or, at least, undiagnosed) 
characters who exhibit some of the characteristics of these impairments, usually intensified and 
exploited in a comical way. It is the latter category of characters that this section focuses on, 
under the assumption that irony-blindness is an instrument of humorous fictional discourse. 
This section attempts to bring together and shed more light on the observations highlighted in 
all previous sections: (a) the difference in interpretation process between the two main irony 
types (Type 1 – meaning reversal and Type 2 – meaning replacement); (b) the strong imbalance 
in the distribution of Type 2 irony between real and fictional discourse contexts (with the 
particular irony type being considerably more frequent in fictional discourse), and (c) the type-
specific causes of irony misinterpretation. In order to achieve this goal, we need analyze the 
functions of Type 2 irony in fictional discourse and examine its link to the irony blind character.  
 
4.2.1. Categories of irony blind characters (some case studies). The aim of discussing a selection 
of representative irony blind characters from different fictional texts is not to provide an 
exhaustive list, but rather to investigate some causes of irony blindness that extend further than 
the realistic and diagnosed representation of PLI (and related disorders) individuals. Typically, 
comic characters are found in the comedy genre, but they can also be found in different (and 
mixed) genres, where they fulfil the purpose of “comic relief”. 
It is worth starting this discussion with literal-minded characters and specifically the, now 
iconic, literal-minded Sheldon Cooper (The Big Bang Theory – CBS, 2007). It is often 
speculated that Sheldon, an exceptionally intelligent theoretical physicist with a notorious 
difficulty with social interaction and in understanding nonliteral/idiomatic language, suffers from 
Asperger Syndrome (or some other type of High Functioning Autism). This, however, has never 
been confirmed on the show. On the contrary, its creators have stated that they have deliberately 
left Sheldon undiagnosed, or even cleared from a diagnosable disorder (one of his most 
characteristic quotes being “I am not crazy, my mother had me tested”), in order to relieve the 
other characters and the audience from any guilt related to laughing at his expense.
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Sheldon’s 
relationship to irony (or “sarcasm” – see note 1) is presented to evolve during the show: in earlier 
episodes he is completely incapable of recognizing it, being in need of a “sarcasm sign”, while in 
later episodes he achieves a few  successful guesses regarding the presence of sarcasm and even 
attempts his (less successful) version of it
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. Examples (10a, 10b, 10c) below demonstrate 
Sheldon’s relationship to irony and, more specifically, its second type (meaning replacement). 
     (10) a.    Sheldon: I have to say, I slept splendidly. Granted, not long, but just  deeply  
         and well. 
Leonard: I’m not surprised. A well known folk cure for insomnia is to break into 
your neighbour’s apartment and clean. 
Sheldon: Sarcasm? 
Leonard: You think? 
b.    Sheldon: Granted, my methods may have been somewhat unorthodox, but I think the 
end result will be a measurable enhancement of Penny’s quality of life. 
Leonard: You know what, you’ve convinced me, maybe tonight we should sneak in 
and shampoo her carpet. 
Sheldon: You don’t think that crosses a line? 
c.   Leonard: Yes! For God’s sake, Sheldon, do I have to hold up a sarcasm sign every   
time I open my mouth? 
Sheldon: You have a sarcasm sign? 
 In these examples, all taken from the same dialogue, but analysed separately since they constitute 
three different occurrences of irony, Sheldon shows uncertainty (10a) and then misinterpretation 
(10b,10c) of examples of the second type of irony (meaning replacement). All examples fall 
within the category of context-relevant incongruous response (driven by the context, but 
obviously counterfactual). As seen in section 3, this subtype of irony can be misinterpreted in 
real discourse, but the likelihood of this happening is very low compared to the first type of 
irony, especially in the cases where the counterfactuality or inappropriateness is blatant (as in the 
present examples). What is also exemplified, here, is the heavy use of the second irony type in 
discourse, especially within the choice of retaining the ironic framework (multiple occurrences 
of the same type of irony within the same scene). Sheldon exemplifies the category of literal-
minded comic characters, who are likely to miss not only irony but also other types of nonliteral 
language, even conventionalized ones (idioms). Other examples of this type of character are 
Peggy Parish’s children’s book character Amelia Bedelia (ongoing series since 1963), as well as, 
from the Greek corpus of examples, the character of Armodios from the series “An ipirxes tha se 
xoriza” (Literal translation “If you existed, I’d break up with you”, Mega channel, 2007), who 
exhibits extreme literal-mindedness to the extent of taking literally even the most common 
idioms. 
The second category of irony blind comedy character is the one who ignores basic common 
world-knowledge facts. Characters representing this category are also expected to miss ironies of 
the second type rather than the first one, since, as explained in section 2, this type relies upon 
general / world knowledge rather than situational knowledge. These characters are not literal-
minded, they are aware of the mechanisms of irony and the only reason they miss it is their lack 
of common knowledge that would help them detect the inappropriateness or counterfactuality of 
statements that carry the second irony type. One such character comes from the Greek comedy 
“Sto para pente” (Idiom translation “In the nick of time”, Mega channel, 2005): the character 
Dalia is a reclusive billionaire who has spent most of her adult life hiding in her mansion with no 
access to the outside world (being especially ignorant of the daily life of the middle and lower-
class). In the following example she demonstrates ignorance of a commonly known type of 
sketch-based theatre, with a very long history in modern Greece. 
 
(11) Fotis:  Pezete mia epitheorisi  
          “They re staging an epitheorisi8” 
Dalia:   Ti ergo? 
          “What play?” 
Fotis:    ‘Stis nu-du tin porta oso thelis vroda’ kati tetio… 
“ ‘Fall on N-D’s deaf ears’ [idiomatic expression/ pun, referring to the then ruling   
political party New Democracy] or something” 
Dalia:  Ti  ipothesi exi?  
           “What’s the story line?” 
Spiros:   Esthimatiko! EPITHEORISI su leei! 
            “(It’s a) romance! He says [it’s an] Epitheorisi[intonational focus]!” 
Dalia:  [in blank expression] Ah. 
 
The ironic expression of Type 2, here, (based on the improbability of play of the epitheorisi 
genre being a romance) is followed by an intonationally stressed (focus) repetition of the genre 
name, to provide the character with a further clue about the irony. However, she responds with a 
confused facial expression, which makes it clear that she completely missed both the irony 
strategy and the speaker’s intended meaning. Her lack of understanding is also accentuated by 
the fact that, before the dialogue moves on, another character remarks “She still doesn’t get it”. 
Dalia’s character is very often seen missing or misunderstanding ironic remarks directed at her, 
making this one of her main comedic strengths. 
A similar but distinct category of irony blind character is the naïve character. A typical 
example would be Baldrick, Blackader’s faithful servant in the TV comedy of the same name 
(Blackadder, 1983, BBC1). Baldrick appears to be of lower intellect but also forever willing to 
trust his master’s judgment and plans. In the following example, it becomes apparent that 
Baldrick’s blind trust extends to the point of believing a completely outrageous and incongruous 
response. 
 
(12) Blackadder: Crisis Baldrick, Crisis! No marriage, no money, more bills! For the first time 
in my life I’ve decided to follow a suggestion of yours. Saddle Prince George’s horse. 
Baldrick: Oh sir, you’re not going to become a highwayman, are you? 
Blackadder: No I’m auditioning for the part of Arnold the bat in Sheridon’s new comedy. 
Baldrick : Oh that’s alright then. 
Blackadder : Baldrick, have you no idea what irony is? 
Baldrick : Yeah! It’s like goldy and bronzy, only it’s made of iron. 
 
Baldrick not only misses the particular irony, which is another example of the second type, but 
also confirms Blackadder’s (and the audience’s) suspicion that he has not even heard of the 
trope. The difference between the naïve irony blind character and the one who ignores world 
knowledge, is that the former’s inability to capture the phenomenon is (additionally to any world 
knowledge deficits) an inability to suspect the interlocutor of insincerity.  
Of course, it is possible that the boundaries between these categories of irony blind characters 
are blurred. For example, Joey, the character from the American TV sitcom “Friends” (1994, 
NBC) occasionally shows signs of both naivety and ignorance, often being presented as a 
character who misses the jokes made at his expense. For example, in the episode “The one with 
the fake Monica”, Joey interprets his friend’s ironic suggestion for the stage name “Joe/Joseph 
Stalin” as a serious one, going as far as to officially adopt it before finding out who the historic 
Joseph Stalin was. 
Although the presented categorization concerns the fictional irony blind characters 
encountered during this investigation (which mostly focused on comic irony blind characters in 
movies and TV), further categories could be added after a more detailed examination across 
fictional discourse genres. It must be added that in the case of surreal/absurdist comedy, 
characters can be completely blind to obviously counterfactual or contextually incompatible 
remarks for no apparent reason. One such example is an episode of the long-running American 
cartoon South Park (1997, Comedy Central) where a whole town becomes incapable of 
recognizing one character’s increasingly absurd ironic remarks, taking them as serious 
suggestions and ending up with a completely nonsensical new sport (Episode “Sarcastaball”). In 
examples such as this one, irony blindness adds up to an absurdist style of humor and is only 
explained as “poetic/dramatic license”. 
On the whole, the main causes of irony misinterpretation detected in the discussion of section 
4.1.2 are also present in the cases of fictional irony blindness. We only looked at non-clinical 
irony blind characters, which is the majority, if not the entirety of comic irony blind characters
9
. 
In this group, the causes of irony blindness seem to be either an extreme or overly exaggerated 
version of the occasional misunderstanding causes encountered in real discourse (lack of 
common knowledge, or inability to interpret the speaker’s intentions), or a highly stereotyped 
case of literal-mindedness, detached from any realistic symptomatology. In either case, it 
becomes apparent that, as indicated by the frequency study in section 3, it is the second irony 
type that is preferred in fictional discourse, for stronger comedic effect, and particularly in 
relation to the irony blind characters and their idiosyncratic characteristics. 
 
4.2.2. The author-character-audience triangle. The question of the relationship between the 
principles and conventions of real discourse and their fictional counterparts is a long debated 
one. In order to complete the present analysis, it is necessary to refer to the special circumstances 
that underlie fictional discourse and the dynamics among the triad author-character-audience.  
Searle’s (1975) early attempt to examine fictional discourse as a Speech Act of the author has 
been met with strong criticism (Culpeper 2001; Wood 2012) and it has since given rise to the 
realization that this type of discourse can only be analyzed through a double-level model, which 
has to include the in-script layer of communication between characters and the outer layer of 
communication between the writer and audience (see also Dynel 2011). 
The intentions of the author(s) are to be taken into consideration within the framework of the 
genre to which their work belongs (Wood 2012). Even though the analysis of authorial intent is 
often considered independent from the perception of the text, the perspective of the present study 
makes it necessary to adopt the two-level schema “addresser-message-addressee” (Figure 2, 















Using this schema, we can discuss the case of irony blind characters, like the ones 
exemplified in the previous section. In the corresponding settings, it is clear that irony blindness 
serves the purposes of comedy (either within the genre of comedy itself, or as comic relief in a 
mixed genre). This means that the main intentions of the author(s) are to evoke comic situations, 
laughter, and even mock the comic irony blind character. This has some important implications 
for the characterisation of the irony blind character. If we follow the distinction between “flat” 
and “round” characters (Culpeper 2001), the former being more predictable, stereotyped, and 
rather one-dimensional, we would have to consider the comedic portrayal and exploitation of 






















characteristic that oversimplifies a complicated real-life condition). Note, however, that this does 
not condemn the character to a permanent state of flatness, since it only concerns the specific 
irony-related property, which serves a certain function and may well be somewhat independent 
from the character’s overall identity and behaviour. The nature of the humor derived from irony 
blindness is usually along the lines of a punchline (see examples in previous section), which is 
why it can be considered a self-contained unit, or a “running gag”, which does not directly 
influence the plot. An irony blind character may thus have a dual nature: that of an otherwise 
realistically portrayed individual, and that of the instrument of the comedic device of 
misunderstanding and frame-breaker (Eco 1984).  
The audience, from their part, approach the text with a pre-existing disposition towards the 
character, towards the scripted situation, and towards the genre, which means that, upon 
identifying (and stereotyping) a character as comically irony-blind, they expect them to 
demonstrate the same behaviour on different occasions and they also anticipate the humorous 
nature of the occurring misunderstandings. Of course, stereotypes and social schemata are more 
effortlessly used when interpreting fictional characters, since the act of stereotyping does not 
bear the same negative connotations that it does in the case of judging real individuals. In other 
words, fictional characters, and especially comic ones, cannot avoid some caricaturization, even 
if this happens on a scale of humanization, i.e. within a mixture of realistic (humanizing – see 
Culpeper 2002) and unidimentional characteristics. 
Finally, one remaining issue, which would have to be covered by a separate study, has to do 
with the coherence of characters in serialised texts with multiple authors (e.g. multiple season 
sitcoms, such as “The Big Bang Theory”). Even though we proceed to characterisation assuming 
a somewhat unified behaviour of the irony blind hero, in reality, the character emerges as the 
sum of behaviours on different, more and less realistic/consistent contexts, which have been 
created by different authors (who may have slightly varying perceptions of the character). It is 
not uncommon for the audience of long-running serials to complain that a hero is acting “out of 
character”, demonstrating a divergence between the authors’ and the audience’s perception of 




This paper attempted to tackle a variety of questions that concern the division between two 
general types of irony and the correspondences between the inherent characteristics of each type 
and their presence and function across natural and fictional discourse.  
The two types of discourse (real-natural-unscripted and fictional-scripted) investigated in this 
paper exhibit a number of different properties. On the one hand, real discourse is guided by 
communication principles which are expected to prioritise rhetorical effectiveness over rhetorical 
innovation, while, at the same time, spontaneity entails the lack of elaborate forward planning in 
the choice and formulation of irony strategies. These characteristics explain the prevalence of the 
simpler and more typical irony strategies that correspond to the meaning reversal type within real 
discourse. On the other hand, fictional discourse operates on two different levels and combines a 
number of more complicated goals: the goal of the author(s) is to induce specific feelings in the 
audience (in the case of comedy discourse, which was the focus here, this goal entails humor, 
laughter, and entertainment), the goal of the fictional character (especially the ironist) is to make 
a strong rhetorical point, while the role of the fictional irony blind character is to accentuate the 
humorous situation by misinterpreting (usually obvious) irony. This therefore justifies why the 
second irony type – meaning replacement – is much more frequent in fictional discourse than 
real discourse, since it is better suited for fitting the multiple purposes of the former. 
We saw that the impairment of fictional and comedic irony blind characters (not diagnosed 
with a real-life pragmatic language impairment) can be attributed to an exaggerated version of 
regular sources of irony misunderstandings: literal-mindedness, lack of world knowledge, and 
naivety. It also became apparent that these three sources of irony blindness are mostly linked to 
the misunderstanding of the meaning replacement type of irony, which would normally be 
considered more obvious. Its strong humorous nature, however, is what makes it a suitable 
candidate for fictional misinterpretations that aim at the creation of humor and the accentuation 
of the peculiarities of the irony blind characters. 
Overall, we provided evidence for the hypothesis that the meaning reversal type of irony is 
both more frequent and more prone to misinterpretation in natural discourse, while the humorous 
nature of the meaning replacement type encourages its use in humorous contexts. Fictional 
humorous contexts proved to be a more fitting environment for the use of the meaning 
replacement type of irony, especially when irony blind characters are present. Of course, the 
crucial division into the two types of verbal irony is still in need of further investigation from 





1 The term “sarcasm” is often used interchangeably with the term “verbal irony”. In the present analysis, sarcasm is 
taken to only partially overlap with irony: it can be a particularly bitter form of irony, with a specific person-target 
(see also Leech 1984: 143-144), but it can also exist independently from verbal irony (non-ironic sarcasm). It is 
worth noting, however, that in everyday use (especially in American English) the word sarcasm is predominantly 
used to mean “verbal irony” (as opposed to situational/ cosmic/ dramatic irony). 
2 Note that the ironic utterance here is a novel irony and, although it is a variation of more conventionalized 
expressions such as “I am the Queen of England”, “I am the Queen of Romania”, it cannot be seen as resonating any 
of them in an echoic manner. 
3 Kapogianni (2013) compiled a diverse corpus of irony instances, c. 20,000 words, using a methodology that 
allowed mutual feedback between raw data and definitional criteria. These were complemented by a critical account 
of the examples presented and discussed in the relevant literature (see also Kapogianni 2011b). 
4 This is part of the project “Investigation of the conversational narratives produced by youths of Patras, Greece” 
funded by the research committee of the University of Patras, Greece (K. Karatheodoris, 2425). I am grateful to Dr. 
Argiris Archakis, research project coordinator, for providing me permission of use. 
5 The equivalents in Greek were: “ironika to ipa/enousa” (I said/meant it ironically), “ironevome” (I am being 
ironic), “den epiases/katalaves tin ironia” (You did not get/understand the irony), “plaka ekana” (I was joking), 
“den to ipa sovara” (I did not say it seriously), and their variations in tense. Of course, the results from search 
phrases that did not explicitly contain the word “irony” and its derivatives were checked on the basis of the 
established criteria for irony in order to determine whether the misinterpreted utterance was indeed ironic. 
6 See http://www.nj.com/entertainment/tv/index.ssf/2009/08 /reader_mail_does_sheldon_from.html -accessed July 
2013.  
7 E.g. Season 2, Episode 23, “The monopolar expedition”. Note the use of his famous catchphrase “Bazinga!” when 
feeling the need to mark non-serious speech. 
8 Epitheorisi: “Modern Greek popular revue with skits and songs that satirize current social and political mores” 
[Oxford Encyclopedia of Theatre and Performance]. In later years it is considered a "lower" form of theatre, often 
associated with bad taste, low production quality, bad writing, and predictable or dull humor. 
9 An exception could be Abed, a character from the American sitcom “Community” (2009, NBC), who explicitly 
mentions being diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome. However, despite some problems with irony intonation and 
unsuccessful uses, Abed is presented as having exceptionally good meta-pragmatic intuitions and emotion-reading 
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